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Richard A. PosnerTorts is not my field. But in one sense neither is it Guido Calabresi's,
although he is a professor of tort law at the Yale Law School. In neither
The Costs of Accidents nor the series of earlier articles1 of which the
book is a summation and amplification will the reader find more than
passing mention of the rules and concepts that constitute the body of accident law or of the procedures and institutions by which that law is
formulated and applied.2 Few cases are discussed and, if I recall correctly, no statutes.
To note the untraditional character of Calabresi's concerns is not
to criticize, but to mark a new direction in legal scholarship. It is no
secret that many law professors have lost interest in the traditional
undertakings of legal research. These were, by a close reading of cases,
to determine what the law was and what it should be. The two
inquiries were really the same. In both cases, one first sought to isolate the basic premises or policies underlying an area of the law by
a close reading of judicial opinions (and, where applicable, statutes and
legislative history) and then compared the specific rules of law developed
by the courts with these premises. If a rule was found to be inconsistent
with the premises, it was rejected as an aberration or, if too well
established for that, as bad law. To be sure, rules were sometimes found
wanting on grounds other than inconsistency with the dominant policies in the field-usually these had to do with the fact-finding or
remedial limitations of the judicial process-but for the most part
logical consistency with premises derived from legal documents was the
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1 Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961);
The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv.
718 (1965); Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YAE L.J.
216 (1965); Views and Overviews, 1967 ILL. L.F. 600; Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAw & ECON. 67 (1968); Does the
Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 LAw & CONTimrP. PROB. 429

(1968).
2 The only extended discussion of cases in the Calabresian oeuvre is in Some Thoughts
on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, supra note 1, at 534-53; and the discussion is
limited to a few special doctrines. The central concepts of the fault system-negligence

and contributory negligence, causation, standard of care, etc.-are not involved.
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touchstone of analysis. Legal scholarship consisted of the interpretation
and logical elaboration of legal materials.
This is not the complete story, because from at least Brandeis' time
there was also a branch of legal scholarship that emphasized facts
rather than logic, generally facts that demonstrated that the premises
of a body of law were out of touch with contemporary social reality.
They can more accurately be described, however, with no invidious
intent, as anecdotes. The "facts" marshalled by Brandeis and other
fact-oriented legal reformers were for the most part stories (not necessarily untrue) told to legislative committees, rather than a product
of rigorous empiricism.
The limitations of textual analysis, logic, and anecdote as tools of
inquiry should be apparent. But they do not explain why the traditional approach has fallen into disfavor among a number of legal
scholars. One displaces a scholarly approach not by showing that it has
limitations but only by producing a better approach.$ Today there are
legal scholars-I would guess a growing number-who believe that
over a broad range of subjects they will make greater progress utilizing
the theories and empirical procedures of the social sciences than continuing to depend exclusively on the methods of traditional legal
scholarship.
In what has been my own field of primary interest, antitrust, this
displacement of emphasis is already far advanced. Few antitrust scholars
believe any more that sound rules of antitrust can be deduced from the
statutes or leading cases; and a celebrated piece of debunking has cast
the anecdotal method into some disrepute. 4 One now finds substantial
and explicit use of economic theory5 and at least one example of the
use of quantitative methods to describe and analyze the enforcement
of the antitrust laws.6 But antitrust is an unusual field: Not only have
economists made significant contributions to it,7 but there is even a
tradition of collaboration between lawyers and economists on research
into antitrust questions.3
Cf. T. KuHN, THE SmaucruRE OF Scmmuic REvOLUTiONS (1962).
4 McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAw & EcoN.
8

137 (1958).
5 As illustrated by the subtitle-as well as the text-of Baxter, Legal Restrictions on
Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966).
Baxter is professor of law at Stanford Law School.
8

Posner, A Quantitative Analysis of Antitrust Enforcement (forthcoming in the

JouRNAL OF LAw Am EcONOMies).
7 A slightly out-of-date summary is H. PACxER, THE STATE OF RESEARCH IN ANTrrusT
LAw 29.42 (1963).
8 See C. KAYsEN & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959); Director & Levi, Law and the
Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 281 (1956).
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The Costs of Accidents is an ambitious effort to employ a social
science perspective (again that of economics) in a field of law in which,
when Calabresi started his work, there was no supportive tradition,
no pioneering work by economists or other social scientists, on which
to rely. In its bold break with conventional legal analysis of tort
questions, Calabresi's work may be a portent of the future direction of
legal scholarship in fields that, unlike antitrust, remain bastions of
the traditional approach.
By this time the reader must be impatient to find out what exactly
the book has to say. Its salient points can be summarized briefly.
Accidents impose costs. These costs, in the Calabresian terminology,
are primary (personal injuries and property damage), secondary (economic dislocation resulting from failure to compensate the victim of an
accident), and tertiary (the costs of administering any scheme designed
to reduce primary and secondary accident costs). The object of accident
law or policy should be to bring about the socially preferred accidentcost level, subject to the constraint that the methods chosen to do so
be consistent with "justice." In practice this constraint turns out to be
rather unimportant; as Calabresi points out, the notion of what is a
just accident policy is likely to be strongly influenced by its success or
failure in coping with the problem of accident costs. Notice that the
goal is not to minimize accidents or accident costs, unless by accident
costs we mean costs net of any benefits. Traffic accidents could be
eliminated by banning motor vehicles. But the price would be too high.
The goal, rather, is to optimize accident costs.
Its attainment is complicated by the reciprocal character of the
components of those costs. A plan that reduced secondary costs-for
example, a scheme of compulsory social insurance against accidentsmight increase primary accident costs by reducing the incentive to avoid
an accident. A plan designed to reduce accidents by (say) forbidding
liability insurance would concentrate accident costs and thereby aggravate the secondary-cost problem. Schemes to reduce tertiary (administrative) costs could increase both primary and secondary costs. And
so on. The obliviousness of most accident-law reformers to these reciprocal relationships, and in particular to the effects of secondary-costreduction schemes on primary accident costs, provides Calabresi with
some occasions for highly effective polemic.9
But there is a hitch in his demonstration of reciprocity. It is not
obvious that the problem of secondary costs is not adequately taken
care of by the availability of medical, life, and disability insurance,
in which event we could largely forget about that problem and con9 See especially pp. 6-23.
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centrate on primary accident costs. Calabresi is aware of this objection
and answers that people, by reason of a psychological quirk, simply
will not insure adequately against accidents; they do not take the risk
of serious personal injury seriously.10 As we shall see, this is not a
satisfactory reply. But the point is not crucial at this stage (it will become so later) since, as a matter of fact, Calabresi devotes most of his
book to discussing how to optimize primary accident costs.
He distinguishes two basic approaches. The first is the market, or
in his terminology "general deterrence," approach. In its pure form,
the market approach involves no government regulation of accidentproducing activities at all; the level of accidents is determined entirely
by voluntary arrangements among members of society. Thus, the number of coal miners killed each year would be a resultant of the demand
for coal, the attitude of coal miners toward risk, the costs of safety
devices, and the costs of other inputs. If the demand for coal was very
large, if safety devices were very costly, and if the supply of coal miners
willing to work for moderate wages despite highly dangerous conditions was also large, then the mortality rate among coal miners would
be relatively high. But suppose instead that prospective coal miners
are highly risk averse. They will demand very high wages, or safety
devices, or both. This assumes that they are informed of the risks
associated with coal mining, but the assumption is reasonable. Just as
product markets provide consumers with the information necessary to
enable them to choose a product (more on this shortly), so the labor
market should provide workers with the information necessary to enable them to choose a job whose risk (and other) characteristics accord
with their preferences. Further, the collection of safety information is
an important function of unions.
The costs of mining coal will now be higher and the output smaller,
unless coal operators can readily substitute other inputs for labor.
Either way fewer miners will be employed; perhaps there will be safety
devices, too. Mortality in the mines will be reduced. The important
point is that whatever the risk preferences of miners may be, the level
of mine accidents will be determined by voluntary transactions in the
marketplace.
10 He gives other reasons for doubting the efficacy of private insurance (see pp. 55-64):
Individuals lack knowledge of risk; they don't insure enough because they think society
will pick up the tab for many of their accident costs; and the establishment of different
risk classes by insurance companies might lead to very high premiums for some people,
and thereby in effect concentrate the costs of accidents heavily on those groups. The
importance and magnitude of these factors are wholly unclear. And Calabresi may
himself regard them as makeweights, since in later discussion he relies exclusively on the
psychological quirk mentioned in the text. See, e.g., pp. 206, 220.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 37:636

Unfortunately, it costs something to negotiate in the marketplace,
and on occasion the costs of voluntary arrangements determining the
number of accidents may be prohibitive: Pedestrians cannot get together and negotiate with drivers in the same fashion that coal miners
can with coal operators (although the private owner of a toll road
might be able to carry on such negotiations implicitly). Where, as in
this example, private contracting is precluded by high transaction
costs, it may still be possible, through law, to simulate a market result.
The trick is to impose the costs of the accident on that participant or
contributor who, by a change in his activity, can reduce those costs
net of any benefits. This will produce the same result as would private
contracting. However, for reasons first explained in a classic article by
Ronald Coasell and well summarized by Calabresi, it is not always an
easy trick to pull off because it may be unclear which accident contributor should be induced to alter his activity. A rule making the driver
always liable in a car-pedestrian accident might induce auto manufacturers to install safety devices in instances where a cheaper way of
avoiding the same number of accidents might be to build pedestrian
overpasses.
The problem just discussed does not exist in all accident contexts.
Where there is a contractual relationship between the potential accident participants, as there is, for example, between an airline and its
passengers and crew, the level of safety and compensation for accidents
can be negotiated just like any other aspect of the relationship. (This
would be true of traffic safety in general if the right of access to the
roads were sold to each individual pedestrian and driver.) Calabresi,
to be sure, argues that such negotiations cannot be depended upon to
produce a socially acceptable accident level. He argues that the individual (passenger or crew member in my example) will systematically
undervalue the risk of an accident, first, because of the psychological
quirk mentioned earlier, and second because individuals lack good
information. But he presents no evidence in support of either ground,
and they are not self-evident. A distinguished contemporary philosopher
has constructed an entire concept of justice on the assumption that
people, far from being reckless in their evaluation of risks, are profoundly risk averse.' 2 And the individual's initial state of ignorance in
safety matters should not be a serious problem in a competitive economy. Let consumers be ignorant of the safety hazards presented by
rotary mowers; one would expect the sellers of other mowers, who have
every incentive to inform consumers of those dangers, to take steps
11 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960).
12 Rawls, Distributive Justice, in PHILOSOPHY, PoLITIcs AND SocEY-TmH
61 n.2 (P. Laslett & W. Rundman eds. 1967).

SmU.s 58,
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to dispel that ignorance. 13 In sum, I think Calabresi erred in treating
"accidents" as the category of analysis. He should have reserved accidents occurring in the course of a voluntary relationship for a different
book: a book on contracts.
Calabresi's criticism of the market or general-deterrence approach
to the problem of primary accident costs sets the stage for a discussion
of the alternative approach, "specific" or "collective" deterrence. The
term means direct public regulation of safety, as in traffic rules and in
laws requiring the installation of seat belts in all new cars. The distinction between market and collective deterrence is unfortunately
quite unclear. Some types of safety regulation, such as traffic rules,
can, it seems to me, be explained better in market-deterrence than in
collective-deterrence terms. Imagine a state in which the highways were
privately owned and there were no traffic laws. One would expect the
highway owners to establish rules of the road, speed limits, and the
like for the same reason that auto manufacturers installed some safety
devices even before they were required by law to do so: in order to
promote use of their product by meeting the user's demand for safety.
These rules might be laxer or more stringent than those imposed by
governments; my point is only that many safety regulations, and specifically the traffic regulations that loom large in Calabresi's discussion
of specific deterrence, need not reflect any dissatisfaction with the level
of accidents determined by the market. These regulations are imposed
by the community because the community is the proprietor of the
transportation facility, the road.
Even where the government is not a proprietor, its safety rules
may instance market rather than collective deterrence. Whether rules
defining the circumstances under which an activity will be deemed
negligent are formulated by courts in the decision of particular cases
or by legislatures is surely a detail. Collective deterrence, as a functionally distinct mode of regulation, comes into play when the government decides that the violator of a rule shall be made to pay a fine or
be imprisoned rather than merely held liable for any injuries or damage that he may cause. This determination may reflect a feeling that
the payment of money to an accident victim in exchange for killing
or injuring him is an inadequate surrogate for a voluntary transaction
(the purchase of the victim's body) and that we should therefore reduce the occasions on which people are forced into such exchanges.
Safety-belt and mine-safety laws instance a distinct form of collecis See Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Cui. L. R v. 47, 62-63 (1969).
Calabresi clinches his argument with the assertion that experience with work-related acddents prior to the adoption of workmen's compensation schemes proves the market's inadequacy. But again he offers no support for his version of that history.
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tive deterrence. Their rationale is pure paternalism. They force people
to pay more to protect themselves (not strangers) than they would voluntarily pay.
Calabresi concludes that a mixed system of general and specific
deterrence is desirable, although he does not indicate in what proportions because he regards that as a mixed empirical and political question. Having established the goals and methods of accident control, he
then asks whether the prevailing system of accident control in this
country, the "fault system" (negligence law), is a rational system for
optimizing accident costs. He concludes that it is not. The fault system not only ignores the problem of secondary costs, save by permitting
private insurance (the inadequacy of which, as we saw, was asserted by
Calabresi earlier in the book); it actually aggravates them by delaying
compensation until the conclusion of an often lengthy jury trial or
settlement negotiation. The dependence on costly and time-consuming
judicial processes also multiplies tertiary (administrative) accident costs.
The fault system is not good at optimizing primary accident costs
either. The notion of "fault" is freighted with moral concepts that get
in the way of so allocating liability as to reduce the (net) costs of accidents. Furthermore, liability is determined by the facts of each particular case rather than by those of an entire class of cases. Moreover, the
judge considers only who between the parties before him is better
able to reduce accident costs, although someone not before the court
at all (e.g., the auto maker) might be best. And in cases where it-is not
clear who is the best cost avoider, judges never consider imposing liability on the party best able to arrange a market transaction by which
liability would be shifted to a better cost avoider. Finally, the ability
of the fault system to devise discriminating rules of liability is limited
by the degree to which insurance companies find it commercially feasible to establish different risk classes.
Calabresi concludes that the fault system is "absurd" and "ineffective" 14 as a system of accident control. But whild asserting that we
could do better, Calabresi proposes no alternative system. The last
part of his book is devoted to an inconclusive discussion of the same
proposals for reform with which he opened. He finds that they cannot
be accepted or rejected without further study.
So brief a summary of The Costs of Accidents cannot do justice to
the author's graceful if somewhat sinuous and elusive style or to the
excellent if sometimes protracted discussions of detail with which the
book abounds. But it can indicate the dominant characteristics of his
approach, which are two: reliance on economic theory, and a weak
1.4 Pp. 276, 316.
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sense of fact. His debt to economic theory is most obvious in the use
of a variety of economic doctrines to establish key points in the analysis: to show why wide cost spreading might not increase the welfare of
society, why schemes of secondary-cost reduction could impair incentives to avoid accidents, why the complete elimination of accidents
would not promote welfare, what the market can and cannot do to
bring about a socially preferred level of accidents, how the presence of
monopoly might alter the analysis, and in a host of lesser ways. At
several points I find myself in disagreement with his use of economic
doctrine. The unwillingness of contemporary economists to ascribe an
automatic increase in total welfare to any redistribution of income from
a wealthier to a poorer person stems not from rejection of the assumption of the diminishing marginal utility of income,15 but from recognition that the interpersonal comparison of utilities is arbitrary. If a
wealthier person's marginal utility curve happens to be higher than the
poorer person's-if he gets more pleasure from a given increment of
income-a redistribution of income from the wealthier to the poorer
may actually diminish total utility even though both curves are downward sloping. 6 And I have already mentioned my disagreement with
Calabresi's tacit assumption that competing firms will not supply
information needed by customers or employees to make intelligent
choices of what to buy or whom to work for. But on the whole, Calabresi's handling of economic doctrine seems, to me at least, highly
competent.
Calabresi's debt to economic theory is greater than I have indicated. That theory supplies the very structure as well as the details of
analysis. The form of The Costs of Accidents is that of "cost-benefit" or
"systems" analysis. These terms describe techniques of applied economics that involve (1) an initial specification of goals, (2) the arraying
of alternative methods of achieving these goals, and (3) the costing out
of each alternative. Calabresi begins by setting forth the goals of accident law, which he derives not from tort cases or other legal materials
but from broad considerations of social policy. He then describes the full
spectrum of alternative methods for achieving these goals; and this
procedure immediately carries him beyond the conventional bounds of
tort doctrine into areas usually thought to belong to the administrative
and criminal law fields. Although he never actually costs out these
alternatives, it is significant that his analysis is cast in terms of comparing their costs and that he subordinates considerations (such as "jus15 Pp. 89-40.
16 A. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF NVELFARE ECONOMICS 30-31

(1944).
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tice") that are not susceptible of precise and objective description. In
principle, his analysis could provide a framework for a quantitative
evaluation of alternative accident-control schemes; 17 at least, the considerations relevant to evaluation have been carefully marshalled.
The utilization of this systematic procedure to bring elementary
but profound insights of economic theory to bear on the accident question proves a powerful forensic and analytical machine with which
Calabresi easily sweeps rival approaches, employing more conventional
legal analytic methods, from the board. He demonstrates that these
methods overlook important consequences of different accident control
schemes, proceed on no coherent theory, and provide little useful
guidance to policy makers; and that an approach grounded in the procedures and theorems of economics offers greater promise. This is the
heart of his achievement. His failure is in exaggerating the utility of
the economic (or any other) approach when uninformed by facts.
One sees this most clearly in his discussion of the fault system. I
noted previously the strong language in which Calabresi rejected the
possibility that the fault system might approximate the model of an
effective accident-control system that emerges from his analysis of goals
and alternative methods for achieving them. But his reasoning is analytic rather than empirical and the analysis is not compelling. That
"fault" is not a term that an economist seeking to optimize accident
costs by identifying the cheapest accident avoider would use is hardly
dispositive. An economist with a taste for reading tort cases has argued
that judges applying the "reasonable-use" standard of nuisance law were
attempting, if perhaps artlessly, so to assign liability as to minimize the
net social costs (or what is the same thing maximize the social product)
of interfering activities.' 8 Could not the reasonable-man standard of
accident law conceal a similar endeavor? The question cannot be answered by reference to a dictionary. My point is not that the language
used in the judicial decisions should be disregarded, but that terms as
inherently ambiguous as "fault" and "reasonableness" require interpretation.
17 What makes this somewhat deceptive, however, is that, as Calabresi recognizes (see
p. 28, n.6), one of his cost components-secondary costs-are not real costs in the economic
sense and cannot therefore be compared directly with primary and tertiary costs, which
are. A secondary cost arises when an accident victim is not compensated (see p. 21). Now
it hardly makes sense to reckon the accident costs of uncompensated victims as twice those
of compensated victims. If, however, the secondary costs sustained by an uncompensated
victim whose primary accident costs (in loss of earnings, medical expenses, and pain and
suffering) are (say) $20,000 are not $20,000, then what are they? And what are his total
costs? It may be important to compensate accident victims but the economic costs of not
doing so are hard to pin down. Perhaps they are normally zero.
18 Coase, supra note 11, at 19-28.
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Nor is it clear a priori that in deciding tort cases judges consider
only the relative abilities of the particular parties before them to minimize net accident costs. It is open to a party to prove that not it but a
stranger to the proceeding-the manufacturer of the automobile, the
contractor who built the roadway, the city that installed (or failed to
install) the traffic signals-was the one "at fault," or to seek contribution from some other party, alleging it to be a joint tortfeasor. And
perhaps the experience accumulated in a series of trials involving accidents of similar types does enable insurance companies to identify accident-prone activities, people, procedures, and equipment and fix premiums accordingly. Although their willingness to differentiate will be
limited by the costs of differentiation, that would be a feature of any
scheme of accident control. A more disturbing characteristic of present
insurance practices is that the accident costs of the most dangerous
drivers are systematically shifted to the less dangerous. Compulsoryinsurance schemes now widely in force require insurance companies
to insure, at rates not much above normal, those drivers whose driving
records or other characteristics make them such poor risks that no
company would voluntarily insure them at rates that the driver would
be willing to pay.19 Such insurance is written at a loss, the deficit being
made up by the companies' other policyholders.
With features such as these, the fault-cum-insurance system is
open to valid criticism. But a compulsory-insurance scheme that encourages accidents is not inevitable. We could if we wished require
that drivers obtain adequate liability insurance at whatever was the
competitive rate for their risk group-this to assure that the costs
of their accidents be made costs to them-and simply bar from the
roads any driver who failed to obtain that insurance. Otherwise we
are subsidizing accidents: more concretely, permitting people to kill
and maim without bearing the costs of such conduct. The weakness
is not in the fault system; it is in the public regulation of the insurance
industry.
While it is apparently true that the ratio of administrative overhead to claims paid is higher in the fault system than in most nonfault
social or private insurance schemes, that is the wrong comparison. The
fault system has a function beyond compensation: the deterrence of
accidents. However large the administrative costs of the system in relation to the compensation paid under it, they may be well worth incurring if the tort system is responsible for even a small reduction in the
accident rate-traffic accidents alone cost society billions of dollars
19

KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFc Vxwsm-A BLUERE~oRbnUG AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 93-94 (1965).

See R.

PIUNT FOR
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every year-unless the same deterrence could be obtained at lower cost
by the use of another system. Finally, since I reject Calabresi's assumption that people are psychologically incapable of voluntarily protecting
themselves by insurance-pitting my intuition against his; neither of
us has evidence-I conclude that the fault system need not entail an
intolerable problem of secondary accident costs.
My argument is not that the fault system is in fact superior to
alternative systems of accident control but that a judgment is impossible without studying how the system operates. Economic theory will
help us to design the necessary studies, but in this instance at least, it
will not yield the answer in advance. Calabresi's leap to judgment is
the more surprising in view of his failure to specify an alternative accident-control system and his unwillingness to reject proposals for reform
that-as he shows so convincingly-themselves rest on shaky conceptual
foundations. As with Hamlet's emotions toward his mother, so with
Calabresi's rejection of the fault system: the explanation must be sought
20
outside the text.
The book, in short, furnishes a useful perspective on the problem
of accident control but not a predicate for deciding between competing
solutions, and this I suspect will be a frequent characteristic of the new
version of legal scholarship exemplified by The Costs of Accidents; at
least it is a major pitfall. A taste for proposing new organizing principles need not be accompanied by interest in devising methods of empirical research that will enable us to use those principles to add to our
knowledge of how the legal system operates and could be improved.
Indeed, it may imply a lack of interest in a useful and familiar if insufficient technique of empirical legal research: the close reading of
cases.
The history of legal scholarship is full of false starts. The promises
of the Legal Realists were never redeemed, and, to move from the
sublime to the ridiculous, there is that parody of empiricism called
"jurimetrics." 21 Calabresi's work is an uncertain portent, too, not so
much because he himself has declined to move beyond prefatory statements of general principle as because he apparently considers such

statements an adequate substitute for examining how the legal system
22
works.
Calabresi's defense, offered early in the book, is that "if we waited
20 See T.S. EuoT, Hamlet and His Problems, in SELEcrED EssAYs-NEw EDrrION 121

(1950).
21 For its flavor see JURIMETRICS

(H. Baade ed. 1963).

And it is disturbing to note the briefivriter's trick of substituting assertions of fact
where the evidence fails, as in Calabresi's discussion of people's psychological dispositions
or the effects of workmen's compensation schemes.
22
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for such facts [facts concerning the actual operation and effects of accident law] to be adequately proven before we made societal changes, we
would rarely if ever depart from the status quo."23 But one could as
plausibly argue the reverse: The status quo that Calabresi so deplores
-the fault system-is likely to continue to resist change in the area
of his primary concern, traffic accidents, until the alleged shortcomings
of the present system are verified by empirical research. This need not
mean forever. Empirical research has already proceeded further in the
accident field than in most other areas of the law, although one would
hardly guess this from The Costs of Accidents. Calabresi cites exhaustively to the economic literature on an obscure point of theoretical
welfare economics, 24 but he does not enlighten the reader as to the state
of empirical research in the accident field.25 From a casual survey, it
appears that the existing empirical work is almost exclusively concerned
with the compensation aspect of the accident-control problem. And
studies of the level, costs, and timing of the reparations received by
accident victims do not illuminate what should be the central question
of public policy in this area: whether the fault system is better at reducing the net costs of accidents than alternative systems. But it is possible
to conceive of studies that would cast considerable light on this question
and need not be of immoderate length, cost, or complexity. Let me
suggest three:
1. One could compare accident rates in jurisdictions having different accident-control schemes or rules (are pedestrians more careless
in jurisdictions in which contributory negligence is no longer a defense?), and in the same jurisdiction before and after a change in tort
law or other relevant institutional change. For example, Saskatchewan
has long had a scheme of social insurance for automobile accident victims, 26 and one could compare the accident rate there with that in

other Canadian provinces, correcting of course for other relevant differences among provinces.
2. As my colleague Harold Demsetz suggests, one could collect
either instances where changes in technology altered the relative costs of
accident avoidance and ask whether the rules of liability were changed
to conform, or instances where the rules changed and ask whether the
23

P. 13.

24 See p. 86, n.21.
25 A casual survey indicates that the empirical literature is extensive. See, e.g., DOLLARS,
DELAY AND THE AUTOMOBII.E VIcr

IN REPARATION FOR HIGHWAY INJURIES AND
-mSTuDms
RELATED CouRT PROBLFMS (Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law 1968); Reynolds,
The Cost of Road Accidents, 119 J. ROYAL STAT. SocIET 393 (1956); cf. W. HADDON, E.
SUcaUAN & D. KLEIN, ACCIDENT RESEARCH: METHODS AND APPROACHES (1964).
26 Described in R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 19, at 140-8.
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changes followed technological developments that affected the relative
costs of accident avoidance.
3. One could ask how many of the doctrines of accident law currently in force can be deduced from the premise that the purpose of
such law is to reduce the (net) costs of accidents.
Perhaps such projects would prove more difficult to undertake
than I think. There is ground for optimism in the fact that accidents,
unlike some other important subjects of interest to the student of legal
institutions, such as collusion, are not covert. At all events, I see no
other way of making substantial forward progress in the accident-control area; and perhaps this is a point with general application to legal
scholarship.

